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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DWAYNE MARVIN CARLSON, 
Defendant/Appe11ant 
Case No. 960135-CA 
Priority No. 2 
In response to the arguments set forth in Appellant Dwayne 
Carlson's ("Carlson") initial brief concerning the impropriety of 
an instruction submitted to Carlson's jury containing an eviden-
tiary presumption (the "Instruction"), the state makes several 
erroneous assertions. First, the state launches into an unrea-
sonable "preservation-of-the-issues" argument. (State's Brief 
("S.B.") at Point I.B.) It claims that although trial counsel 
timely objected to the defective Instruction on the grounds that 
it was inconsistent with statutory law and improper to introduce 
to the jury pursuant to Utah case law, and cited to -a case deal-
ing with the constitutionality of evidentiary presumptions, trial 
counsel failed to preserve such arguments for appeal purposes. 
Second, the state employs a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" 
analysis in assessing the defective Instruction. (S.B. at Point 
I.C.) The analysis is inappropriate, yet serves as the basis for 
the state's response on the merits to the issues raised in Carl-
son's brief. For the reasons set forth in Carlson's briefs and as 
supported by the record on appeal, Carlson respectfully requests 
the entry of an order vacating the conviction and judgment, and 
remanding the case for a new trial. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN AN ATTEMPT TO SALVAGE THE DEFECTIVE JURY 
INSTRUCTION, THE STATE PRESENTS A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS 
THAT MISCONSTRUE, MISINTERPRET AND MISUNDERSTAND THE 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND RELEVANT CASE LAW, 
This case concerns the submission of an instruction to the 
jury that is not grounded in Utah statutory or case law.1 
Compare the Record on Appeal (MR.fl) at 110 to State v. Graves, 
717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-402 (1995) 
and -408 (1995) . It permits the jury to find that defendant 
"knew" property in his possession was recently stolen (R. at 110-
12), based merely on the state's evidence that the defendant was 
in possession of recently stolen property. The trial court in 
this matter submitted the Instruction to the jury even though 
Carlson provided an explanation for his possession of the 
property. (R. 110, 207-217.) The Instruction offends basic 
notions of justice and is erroneous. It eliminates the mental 
1
 To reiterate, the challenged Instruction states the following: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from 
which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light 
of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the 
case, that the person in possession of the stolen property 
stole the property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in possession of 
property, (2) that the property was stolen, (3) that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time from the theft, 
and (4) that no satisfactory explanation of- such possession 
has been given or appears from the evidence, then you may 
infer from those facts and find that the defendant stole the 
property and knew the property was stolen. 
(R. 110, 096, 267-69.) To the extent the Instruction is based on Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-402, it is a distortion of the statute, which provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property. 
2 
culpability element necessary to a conviction for "possession" of 
stolen property and/or relieves the state of proving that 
element. It also requires the defendant to prove innocence. 
In response to the issues of error set forth in Carlson's 
initial brief (Brief of Appellant, dated July 25, 1996, at Point 
I), the state offers a "preservation-of-the-issues" argument, 
then shifts to a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis, both of 
which are inapplicable in this case. In addressing Carlson's 
issues, the state misinterprets case law and fails to distinguish 
compelling Utah and federal precedent supporting Carlson's 
position. The state's arguments should be disregarded as set 
forth in the initial brief and as further set forth below. 
A. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL WERE 
NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED IS UNREASONABLE. 
The state correctly asserts that when the prosector 
introduced the defective Instruction on the day of trial (R. 72-
87), counsel for Carlson interposed a timely objection and 
stated, among other things, that the Instruction was a distortion 
of the inapplicable statutory presumption set forth at Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-402, "that possession of property recently stolen is 
prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the 
property" (R. 267-69) see note 1, supra; the language of the 
Instruction went beyond the statutory language of § 76-6-4 02 by 
creating an evidentiary presumption for a "possession" charge; 
and Utah case law prohibited use of such instructions since the 
statutory presumption would be relevant only to determine 
3 
"whether there was sufficient evidence to convict," which is a 
determination for the court and not for the jury. (Id.); see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-402. The trial court interrupted counsel mid-
objection to state the following: "based on the [trial court's] 
reading of [State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986), the] 
objection is noted but overruled." (R. 268.) Significantly, the 
Graves case, which the trial court "read[]M and "based" its 
decision on, considered limitations on the statutory presumption 
at issue, its use by the courts to determine "whether there was 
sufficient evidence to convict," and its validity under the 
federal constitution. Graves, 717 P.2d at 717 ("[The use of the 
statutory presumption] does not offend the federal constitution" 
(citing Barnes v. U.S., 412 U.S. 837 (1973), which analyzed an 
evidentiary presumption under Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6 (1969); 
U.S. v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and U.S. v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 
63 (1965))) . 
Thus, on appeal Carlson has challenged the Instruction as an 
improper expansion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 02 (Brief of 
Appellant at Point I.A.); as a misuse of the statutory presump-
tion (id. at Point I.B.); and as unconstitutional (id. at Point 
I.C.). The state asserts Carlson preserved only two narrowly-
defined issues: that the statutory presumption did not apply 
because Carlson was not charged with theft, and Graves is not 
controlling. The state's argument is illogical and lacks 
analysis. Carlson has adequately preserved all issues. 
The purpose of preserving objections is set forth in Utah 
4 
case law: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis 
of the objections and have an opportunity to correct 
any errors before the case goes to the jury. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v. 
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (fl[I]n order to preserve a 
plea of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably 
by counsel to the trial court . . . to allow the trial court to 
correct any error, if error there be"); Wurst v. Dep't of 
Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991) (issue 
sufficiently raised where mentioned in letter to department which 
served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision). 
In this case, the preservation concerns were served, where 
counsel raised the issues and the trial court took the 
opportunity to rule on the matter, overruling the objection based 
on its "reading" of Graves. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1161 (Utah 1991) (no waiver when trial court addresses merits of 
issue); State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied, 
510 U.S. 865 (1993). The issues surrounding the impropriety of 
the Instruction have been properly preserved making it 
unnecessary for Carlson to "argue manifest injustice or plain 
error." (S.B. at 15.) The matter must now be resolved on appeal. 
B. THE STATED FIRST "MERITS" ARGUMENT AT "POINT I.C." 
EMPLOYS AN INCORRECT ANALYSIS. 
The state focuses its first "merits" argument on that 
portion of the Instruction that permitted "the jury to presume 
[Carlson] stole the truck, [even though Carlson] was not charged 
5 
with theft or larceny." See note 1, supra, (S.B. at Point I.e., 
p. 15-25) .2 The state's argument on that issue is somewhat 
disjointed, as set forth below. 
1. Contrary to the State's Assertion, Graves Does Not 
Deal with the Issues Raised in this Matter. 
The state first asserts that the Utah Supreme Court in 
Graves "dispose[d]" of the issue concerning whether it is 
permissible to submit a presumption instruction to a jury in a 
possession case. (S.B. at 15-16.) Yet as the state later 
acknowledges (S.B. at 17), Graves is not an "instruction" case. 
11
 [T] he sole point raised on cippeal [in Graves] is insufficiency 
of the evidence to prove that defendant knew or had reason to 
believe the property was stolen." Graves, 717 P.2d at 717. 
Graves considers whether it is appropriate for a court to take 
into account an evidentiary presumption, similar to that which is 
in issue in this case, in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Graves does not address whether such a persumption may 
be submitted to a jury. 
2. Graves Is Markedly Distinguishable. 
The state next makes an illogical leap. It assumes without 
discussion that Graves supports the proposition that it is 
2
 The state makes repeated references to the "theft" portion of the 
Instruction as its focus throughout Point I.e. of its brief: S.B. at 17-
18 ("The question becomes whether use in the instruction of language 
permitting an inference that defendant stole the vehicle constitutes 
reversible error . . .") ("The absence of the language relating to 
defendant stealing the truck would not change the fact that defendant 
admitted [possession] ") ; 20 ("Inasmuch as the jury would still have been 
entitled to infer the requisite knowledge to convict defendant absent the 
language presuming that he stole the truck, confidence in the verdict is 
not undermined"). 
6 
permissible in a possession case to submit an instruction to the 
jury that presumes intent based on the factors set forth in the 
Instruction at issue. (R. 110, factors (1), (2), (3) & (4).) 
"[A]Ithough Graves did not involve a jury instruction challenge, 
it is clear from Graves that the presumption is a factor which 
the finder of fact must have at its disposal in making its ul-
timate determination of guilt." (S.B. at 17.) Again, since Graves 
concerned "sufficiency of the evidence" the state has failed to 
distinguish between that court-made determination and a jury in-
struction. That distinction must be recognized. In addition, the 
state has misconstrued the "presumption" identified in Graves. 
a. The "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" 
determination should not be transformed 
blindly into a jury instruction. 
Carlson pointed out in his opening brief that the trial 
court is responsible for making factual determinations in many 
situations. Courts determine (1) whether evidence must be 
suppressed; (2) the qualifications of a person to be a witness, 
and similar evidentiary issues, Utah R. Evid. 104; (3) the 
voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, State v. Hinton, 
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984) (citing Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 
477 (1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to a jury does not change 
the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a question 
for the court rather than the jury)), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 n.71 (Utah 1988); and (4) 
jurisdiction and venue, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1995). 
While a party may introduce at trial evidence relating to the 
7 
geographical location of a crime, the evidence does not consti-
tute a relinquishment to the jury of the trial court's obligation 
to determine jurisdiction. By the same token, evidence of 
possession of recently stolen property should not transform the 
court's duty to determine "sufficiency" into a jury charge, even 
if the presumption language irequires the jury to make a finding 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Whatever the language, the 
evidentiary determination is for the court. 
Stated another way, "court-made" determinations relate to 
admissibility, presentation and sufficiency of evidence adduced 
at trial. The responsibility to determine such issues is not 
given to juries for many reasons: The court controls the 
proceedings; ensures orderliness, fairness, and impartiality, 
among other things; and is presumed skillful and knowledgeable 
with respect to the rules governing procedure and in considering 
evidentiary matters. Not so with juries. Juries are not empowered 
with determining evidentiary sufficiency and admissibility issues 
because it is doubtful they could make such determinations 
reliably. See Lego, 404 U.S. at 483. Juries likely would be 
influenced by improper considerations. For that reason, rules 
that apply to evidentiary questions of law should not be blindly 
adhered to in considering the duties of the "jury" and the jury's 
limited abilities. 
[The sufficiency of the evidence determination] is one of 
law and not of fact. When a court submits a case to a jury, 
the court necessarily determines that there is sufficient 
evidence to justify a conviction. The court cannot leave 
that question to a jury. To do so would be to make the jury 
judges of both the law and the facts. 
8 
State v. Barretta, 155 P. 343, 347 (Utah 1916). For the above-
stated reasons, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence presumption 
identified in Graves is a question of law that cannot be blindly 
transformed into a question of fact for jury consideration, as 
the state suggests. 
b. The "presumption" identified in Graves is 
applicable only when the defendant has failed 
to offer an explanation concerning his 
possession of stolen property. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court in Graves ruled that in 
considering the "sufficiency of the evidence," possession of a 
stolen vehicle may raise the inference that the defendant knew 
the vehicle was stolen, the inference is raised only where 
"[d]efendant did not offer any explanation to the arresting 
officer or at the trial that he did not know [the vehicle he 
possessed was stolen]. Such failure to explain his possession 
raises an inference that he knew the property was stolen." 
Graves, 717 P.2d at 717. 
Graves is consistent with Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845, where the 
United States Supreme Court dealt with a presumption instruction 
that "permitted the inference of guilt from unexplained 
possession of recently stolen property." Id. (emphasis in 
original). As set forth in the state's brief (S.B. at 27), the 
Supreme Court in Barnes was "deal[ing] with a traditional common-
law inference deeply rooted in our law. For centuries courts 
have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may 
be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of stolen 
goods." Id. at 843 (emphasis added). Thus, Barnes and Graves 
9 
teach that where the defendant fails to explain possession, the 
presumption is permissible. 
Another conclusion is reached when defendant somehow offers 
an explanation: the presumption is impermissible. Any other 
result would make the explanation a factor in finding intent, 
where the jury would be required to consider whether the 
explanation was unsatisfactory before it could draw the inference 
of intent. 
The Instruction in this matter illustrates the problem when 
the defendant offers the explanation and the presumption is given 
to the jury. Here, the Instruction permitted the jury to infer 
mental culpability if it found "from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . [(1) that defendant was in possession of 
property (2) that was stolen (3) recently and] (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence." (R. 110 (emphasis added).) The 
Instruction requires the state to present only evidence of 
possession and that the property was recently stolen. (R. 110, 
factors (1), (2), & (3)), see note 1, supra. If the jury found 
the first 3 factors set forth in the Instruction, it was then 
required to consider whether the explanation "given" by Carlson 
was not satisfactory beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
presume intent. Thus, in this case proof of intent hinged on the 
sufficiency of Carlson's explanation. Barnes, 412 U.S. 846, n.ll 
(the practical effect is to shift the burden to the defendant 
where "ordinarily the Government's evidence will not provide an 
explanation of [defendant's] possession"). The burden fell 
10 
squarely on Carlson to establish the explanation as "satisfac-
tory" beyond a reasonable doubt in order that intent would not be 
presumed.3 The state was relieved of its duty to affirmatively 
prove the intent element. 
Since the presumption here was impermissible, the Court must 
consider the prejudice to Carlson, addressed below. 
3. The State Failed to Employ the Prejudice Analysis 
Applicable When Considering an Erroneous Instruction. 
In lieu of the prejudice analysis, the state employed a 
"sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis (S.B. at 20-25), further 
reflecting the state's inability to distinguish between "suffi-
ciency of the evidence" and prejudice, which is relevant when 
considering an erroneous instruction. The state proceeded to 
"marshal" the evidence presumably in favor of either a possession 
or theft conviction, and asserted that the marshalled evidence 
served to convict Carlson of possession since the presumption 
Instruction permitted the jury to infer mental culpability. 
While the Instruction in fact permitted such an inference, the 
state's argument rings hollow for want of analysis. 
3
 While the Court in Barnes noted that "some evidence tending to 
explain a defendant's possession consistent with innocence does not bar 
instructing the jury on the inference," Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846, n.9, 
that dictum is consistent with barring use of the common law inference 
when the defendant actually offers an explanation. The Barnes note 
should be construed to define "some evidence" as the surrounding 
circumstances as opposed to defendant's evidence going to explanation. 
Once defendant offers the explanation, use of the inference would 
improperly hold him to a higher standard by requiring him to "prove" the 
explanation was satisfactory. That burden on defendant is greater than 
requiring him to present "some" proof to negate intent. State v. 
Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981). In this case, the jury was 
required to apply a more critical analysis to Carlson's evidence than is 
required by the law. The Instruction improperly emphasized the explan-
ation as a critical component of the intent element, relieving the state 
of the burden of establishing that element. 
11 
The state should focus on the prejudice prong relevant to a 
claim that an instruction is defective. Additional evidence 
concerning possible mental culpability may be adequate for a 
sufficiency challenge, but adds nothing to the fact that the jury 
was misinstructed and likely relied on that Instruction to 
convict, thereby prejudicing Carlson.4 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the court 
reversed a murder conviction because of an erroneous instruction: 
Under the instruction given, the jury could have mistakenly 
believed that reckless conduct alone is sufficient to prove 
murder in the second degree. Second, because the second de-
gree murder statute does not include the word "recklessness" 
in describing the actor's mental state and the man-slaughter 
statute does, we think the error should have been obvious to 
the trial judge. Third, we find that the error was 
prejudicial because we cannot be sure that the jury did not 
convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental state alone. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. Likewise, in State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 
1329 (Utah 1989), the court considered a jury-instruction issue 
4
 The state's reliance on U.S. v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 104 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 28 (1992), in its "marshalling" 
argument (S.B. at 25), is misleading. In Pineda-Ortuno, the appellants 
"complain[ed] about the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding 
the elements of the firearms charges under Sec. 924(c). The indictment 
charged appellants only with 'carrying a firearm', but the court 
instructed the jury using the phrase 'knowingly used or carried a 
firearm.'[] They also challenge[d] the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of their convictions on these counts." Id. at 103 (emphasis add-
ed) . Thus it was appropriate for the court to marshal the evidence in 
favor of the verdict. In addition, this Court should not read State v. 
Anderson, No. 940149 (Utah December 13, 1996), to require marshalling of 
the evidence in the case of a defective instruction. In Anderson, the 
court refused to address defendant's claim that an instruction was error 
where the instruction permitted the jury to convict for aggravated sexual 
assault if it found defendant acted "recklessly." The defendant waived 
any objection in the trial court to the instruction. Slip opinion at 3. 
The defendant next argued "it would be manifestly unjust and deny [him] 
due process of law to incarcerate him for a crime that should not be 
recognized in Utah, i.e. reckless aggravated sexual assault." Id. at 4. 
The defendant also acknowledged that the beating and sexual assault at 
issue "must statutorily and logically always be knowing or intentional." 
Id. at 4-5. Defendant's second claim was separate from the "erroneous" 
instruction claim, thus treated separately. 
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under the prejudice standard. The defendant argued the instruc-
tion in issue did not reflect the law that voluntary intoxication 
may be found to "negate[] the existence of the mental state which 
is an element of the offense." Id. at 1331. Thus the court found 
the instruction erroneous. Id. With regard to the prejudice 
analysis, the court did not marshal the evidence, but focused 
exclusively on the fact that defendant made no contention whatso-
ever at trial that his intoxication negated the "knowledge of or 
intent" associated with the offense. " [D]efendant did not rely 
on an intoxication defense as his theory of the case." Id. at 
1332. Thus, the error was harmless. 
In considering the harmless standard in this case, the Court 
should be quick to find prejudice where Carlson explained his 
possession, his defense focused on his lack of mental culpa-
bility, and the evidence presented by the state was disputed, 
conflicting and circumstantial. See U.S. v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 
1098, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (record showed prejudice where "only 
disputed circumstantial testimony [existed] about the defendant's 
reason for being in Cincinnati and his possible use of the phone 
in connection with the cocaine transaction"). There was no 
direct evidence that Carlson was aware that the truck was stolen 
particularly since it had a damaged front end (R. 207-08), was in 
need of repairs (R. 209), and, according to the state's 
witnesses, bore no sign of forced entry. (R. 171, 187.) It is 
highly possible the jury simply eliminated all conflicts by 
relying on the presumption Instruction to convict Carlson. 
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The marshalled evidence is irrelevant. What is relevant is 
that Carlson's defense focused on his lack of mental culpability 
to commit the offense. Thus a presumption going to that element 
of the offense creates the greatest prejudice. 
C. IN THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO CARLSON'S CHALLENGES, THE 
STATE DISREGARDS COMPELLING INFORMATION AND AUTHORITY. 
The state weaves the "sufficiency of the evidence" analysis 
and argument into its response to Carlson's challenges. That 
alone is sufficient reason to reject the state's additional 
contentions. The state's contentions are further faulty. 
1. The State's Argument Concerning the 
Constitutionality of the Instruction Lacks Analysis. 
a. The state relies on distinguishable cases 
and erroneous propositions in its argument 
that the Instruction is constitutional. 
In response to Carlson's argument that the presumption set 
forth in the Instruction is irrational and arbitrary (see Brief 
of Appellant at Point I.e.3.), the state claims the presumption 
is valid " [a]s explained in subsection C, " where it merely cited 
to Graves and improperly employed a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" 
analysis (see Point I.B.2. and 3., supra, in reply thereto). The 
state then claims the presumption is sound because it requires 
the jury "to find each of the underlying facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (S.B. at 27.) By that statement the state 
simply recognizes that the Instruction requires the jury to make 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 110.) That is irrelevant 
to the constitutional analysis in the context of this case. 
The Court in Barnes did not ask whether the instruction 
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required the jury to make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but whether common sense and experience tell us beyond a 
reasonable doubt that based on a specific fact, an inference of 
the existence of a second fact may be drawn. If common sense and 
experience tell us that one set of facts will support an innocent 
explanation, the instruction fails the due process analysis. 
Asked another way, does common sense tell us that a person in 
possession of mail addressed to another must have known the mail 
was stolen? Yes, mail bears the identity of the rightful owner. 
Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845. Does common sense tell us that 
possession of marihuana supports an inference that defendant must 
have known it was imported into the United States? No, common 
sense and experience tell us that marihuana is also grown 
domestically. Leary, 395 U.S. at 6.5 Another result is reached 
5
 The Court in Leary held that mere possession of marihuana did not 
support an inference that defendant had the knowledge concerning a 
characteristic particular to that marihuana -- that it was illegally 
imported into the United States. The possibility that any given marihuana 
was domestically grown made the inference too tenuous. 
In another case, Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Court 
considered a statutory presumption that stated "possession of a firearm 
or ammunition by [a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence 
or is a fugitive from justice] shall be presumptive evidence that such 
firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received." Tot, 319 
U.S. at 464. In determining whether proof of the first fact furnished 
a rational basis for inference of the existence of the second fact, the 
Court stated the inference was "inconsistent with any argument drawn from 
experience." Id. at 468. "Whether the statute in question be treated 
as expressing the normal balance of probability, or as laying down a rule 
of comparative convenience in the production of evidence, it leaves the 
jury free to act on the presumption alone once the specified facts are 
proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing evidence. And 
this we think enough to vitiate the statutory provision." Id. at 469. 
That same conclusion applies in this case -- Carlson's possession of the 
truck is not logically related to the possibility that Carlson knew the 
beat-up, dented truck was stolen before he came into possession of it. 
Barnes commands a different result because of the nature of the 
stolen property. In that case, the defendant was charged with violating 
(continued...) 
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with heroin, which cannot be grown domestically. "'Common sense7 
. . . tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably 
become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled, unless 
they practice a studied ignorance to which they are not 
entitled." Barnes, 412 U.S. 845, n. 10. Does common sense tell 
us that presence at an illegal still supports an inference that 
defendant possessed the still? No, not without more. Romano, 382 
U.S. at 136. 
, The state claims that under the Barnes "reasonable-doubt" 
test, the Instruction was valid: 
Without a satisfactory explanation from defendant for his 
possession of the truck, the aggregate of the undisputed 
evidence, defendant's admissions, actions, and statements, 
his credibility, and the* surrounding circumstances 
generally, as set forth in subsection C, supra [which 
includes a recitation of the state's conflicting, disputed. 
and circumstantial evidence], combine to permit a rational 
juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew 
or reasonably should have known that the truck was stolen. 
(S.B. 29.) The state's analysis has little to do with the few 
facts identified as forming the presumption here. See note 1, 
supra. The state has failed to address how "possession" of a 
truck that has a smashed front end (and hence no license plate), 
is in disrepair, and recently has been reported as stolen, is 
5(...continued) 
18 U.S.C. § 1708, for possessing U.S. treasury checks stolen from the 
mails and knowing them to be stolen. The Supreme Court recognized the 
characteristics unique to mail that make it obvious that its lawful owner 
has been deprived possession. "The evidence established petitioner 
possessed recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not 
know." Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845. The characteristic particular to mail, 
obviously, is the identity on the front of the mail of the rightful 
owner. In this matter, there was no "addressee" label affixed to the 
truck -- thus Carlson had no way to know from the truck itself that it 
was stolen before it came into his possession. 
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sufficient to permit a rational juror to presume "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" that defendant knew the truck was stolen. See U.S. 
v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), Learv v. United States, 395 U.S. 
6 (1969), and Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The state's argu-
ment fails for lack of analysis. The presumption is irrational. 
b. The state incorrectly asserts that in the 
context of inferences, it is appropriate to 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant. 
In response to Carlson's claim that the Instruction 
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof, the state again 
has misconstrued Barnes. (S.B. at 29.) In that case, the Court 
stated without equivocation, "the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did have knowledge that the 
property was stolen, an essential element of the crime, remains 
on the Government." Barnes, 412 U.S. 845, n.9. "The burden of 
going forward may not be freely shifted to the defendant." Id. 
The instruction in Barnes did not "shift the burden" as the 
Instruction in this case did. The Barnes instruction did not 
require the jury to consider the defendant's explanation as a 
factor in determining intent. It merely stated that if an 
explanation was not offered, and if the jury found "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that defendant possessed the recently stolen 
mail with its unique identifying characteristics, the jury could 
draw from those facts and common sense the inference that the 
defendant knew the mail was stolen. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 840 n.3. 
The Instruction in this matter goes well beyond the 
permissible. Here the Instruction required the state to prove 
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only the first three factors:: possession and that the property 
was recently stolen. (R. 110, factors (1), (2) & (3).) The 
Instruction also required the jury to determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt whether a satisfactory explanation of possession 
had been given or appeared from the evidence. The Instruction 
gave Carlson no choice. He had to prove the explanation to the 
satisfaction of the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
that intent would not be presumed. Such a provision has not been 
considered in any case relied upon by the state. The Instruction 
had the effect of requiring Carlson to prove his innocence 
without requiring the state to prove mental culpability. 
In addition, the Instruction required the jury to charge 
Carlson with the burden of proving a lack of mental culpability 
"by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably 
greater than 'some' evidence -- thus effectively shifting the 
burden of persuasion on the element of intent." State v. 
Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1981) (cites omitted). 
State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985). He was 
required to present an explanation that was satisfactory "beyond 
a reasonable doubt." The Instruction placed the burden on 
Carlson to prove innocence. The language of that provision 
coupled with the prosecutor's statement that "[t]he only real 
issue here is whether or not you buy his explanation as to how he 
gained possession of this property" (R. 272) compel the entry of 
an order vacating Carlson's sentence. 
18 
2. The State Again Misconstrues Graves in Support of 
Its Claim that the Instruction Comports with Utah 
Statutory Law. 
The state again relies on its claim that the Instruction 
submitted to the jury in this case is consistent with the common 
law presumption set forth in Graves and Barnes. As set forth 
above, that argument is faulty. See Point I.B., supra. 
The state also takes liberties with Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
503 (1995) . That provision concerns the submission to the jury of 
presumptions "established by this code or other penal statute." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-503. The state would have this Court read 
more into the statute to include "common law" and prosecutorial-
created presumptions. (S.B. at 30-31.) 
If the legislature had intended that all forms and manners 
of presumptions would be submitted to juries under Section 76-1-
503, "it may be presumed it would have said so in language which 
readily would convey such a meaning. The language employed does 
not convey that meaning." Barretta, 155 P. at 346. Indeed, the 
legislature has enacted an evidentiary presumption relevant to 
"possession" cases. In a case for the offense of receiving stolen 
property, the Utah code provides the following: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or 
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing 
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of 
it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) 
is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property 
stolen on a sevarate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year 
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preceding the receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, 
retained, or disposed, acquires it for a consideration which 
he know is far below its reasonable value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is 
a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business 
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or 
personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative 
of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person 
delivering to the property to [provide verifying 
information]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) (emphasis added). If the 
legislature had intended mere possession of property to be 
sufficient to presume intent in a possession case, it would have 
included such a presumption. The trial court disregarded Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-503 by submitting a presumption to the jury that 
has not been recognized by statute or at common law. 
3. This Court's Ruling in Perez Is Inapplicable to the 
Issues in This Case. 
Finally, the state has recognized that in the past, the Utah 
Supreme Court has found error when an instruction patterned after 
Section 76-6-402 has been submitted to the jury. (S.B. at 35 
(citing State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah 1986) 
(instructing the jury in the statutory language was error); 
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327 (instruction was erroneous and 
confusing to the jury); State v. Crowder 197 P.2d 917 (Utah 1948) 
(error to instruct jury with regard to statutory language))).6 
6
 In Carlson's original brief, he recognized that the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987), 
appears to have retreated from Chambers without discussion. The court 
(continued...) 
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A different result was reached in State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1996), petition for cert, filed (Utah 11/5/96) (No. 
960476). In that case, defendant was charged with possession. 
The state submitted an instruction differing in part from the 
Instruction in this case. This Court upheld that instruction. 
Perez is distinguishable from this matter in several respects. 
First, as set forth in Point I.B.2. and I.C.I., supra, the 
Instruction in this case permits the jury to presume mental 
culpability after it has determined defendant's explanation of 
possession is not satisfactory "beyond a reasonable doubt." (R. 
110.) The Instruction stated, " [I]f you find from the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt . . . (4) that no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession has been criven or appears from the 
evidence, then you may infer from those facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was stolen." 
(R. 110.) The emphasized language was not included in the Perez 
instruction. Thus, the Instruction submitted to Carlson's jury 
went beyond the instruction submitted in Perez by requiring 
Carlson's jury to determine whether the explanation "given" by 
Carlson was satisfactory before finding intent. 
Second, this Court in Perez did not address the validity of 
the instruction in response to the same arguments raised in this 
6(...continued) 
cites to Smith in support of the proposition that an instruction 
patterned after the statutory presumption set forth at Section 76-6-402 
"was not defective." Id. The rationale of that decision is unclear 
given the above-cited cases. (Brief of Appellant, dated July 25, 1996, 
at 17, n.4.) 
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case, where Carlson has pointed out the distinctions between the 
"common law" presumption identified in Graves and Barnes, and the 
Instruction in this matter (Point I.B. and I.C.I., supra). Graves 
and Barnes compel the determination that once the defendant 
offers an explanation, the presumption is impermissible. 
Third, this Court in Perez did not address whether it is 
proper to submit a presumption instruction to the jury under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-503, where such presumption is not established 
at common law or under statutory law. (See Point I.C.2., supra.) 
Each of the arguments identified in this case, but not discussed 
in Perez, were preserved in the trial court in this matter and 
must be considered by this Court. 
In addition to the distinctions above, the Perez decision is 
inapplicable because it is incorrect. It deviates from Smith, 
Chambers, and Crowder and is in conflict with Utah law that 
possession of recently stolen property alone is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction. 
The mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the 
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient 
to justify a conviction of larceny of the property.[] It 
is, however, a circumstance to be considered in connection 
with the other evidence in the case in the determination of 
the guilt or innocence of the possessor. Such possession is 
a circumstance tending in some degree to show guilt, 
although it is not sufficient, standing alone and 
unsupported by other evidence, to warrant a conviction. In 
addition to the proof of the larceny and of the possession 
by the defendant, there must be proof of corroborating 
circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt. Such 
corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts, 
conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if any, 
of the defendant which tend to show his guilt. 
State v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 1972) (footnote cite 
omitted); accord Smith, 726 P.2d at 1235; State v. Clayton, 658 
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P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983); State v. Thomas, 244 P.2d 653, 654 
(Utah 1952); State v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 802, 805-06 (Utah 1944); 
State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247, 249 (Utah 1931). The Perez ruling is 
contrary to established precedent. Thus, a Petition for 
Certiorari has been filed with the Utah Supreme Court in that 
matter. (A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as an 
addendum.) The uncontested petition is pending. 
POINT II. THE STATE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROSECUTORS 
CLOSING STATEMENTS AS REFLECTING ON THE EVIDENCE IS 
INCORRECT. 
As set forth in Carlson's initial brief, in closing argument 
the prosecutor made improper statements asking the jurors to 
place themselves in the position of the used car salesman in this 
matter. He submitted to the jurors that if they saw Carlson 
driving in their car, they would not "simply let him walk away." 
(R. 293-94.) The state dismisses such closing remarks as based 
on "common sense," and as urging the jury to evaluate the 
conflicting and circumstantial evidence. The statements do not 
reflect on the evidence, and in similar situations have been 
determined improper. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 
1993) (statements referencing the jury's obligation to society 
were improper); State v. Powell, 816 P.2d 86, 89 (Wash. App. 
1991) (in a child molestation case, the prosecutor's argument 
that a not-guilty verdict would "send a message that children who 
reported sexual abuse would not be believed, thereby 'declaring 
open season on children,'" was improper), review denied, 824 P.2d 
421 (1992); State v. Wainwright, 856 P.2d 163, 168 (Kan. App. 
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1993) (prosecutor's argument in drug case that jury should find 
the defendant guilty and send a message that a person "can't come 
into this State, make money, profit off the misery and addiction 
of others" was improper); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (comments that death penalty be imposed 
for love of the victims and future victims held improper). 
Indeed the trial court in this matter apparently considered 
the statements improper but not prejudicial, notwithstanding the 
conflicting and circumstantial evidence. (R. 295 (trial court 
acknowledged that the argument was "a little pointed" but not 
"unduly inflammatory").) 
Like the statements made in Dunn, Powell, and Wainwricrht, 
the statements in this case do not reflect a discussion of the 
evidence. Their sole function was to appeal to the jurors' 
emotions and sympathy for the used car salesman, as well as 
concerns for society as a whole. In addition, the prosecutor's 
argument is tantamount to vouching for the credibility of the 
used car salesman in this matter, another category of 
prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 
& n.22 (Utah 1989) (court condemned attempt to cloak prosecution 
witness with "explicit personal assurances"), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 163 (1995). Here the prosecutor's argument implied the 
belief that the used car salesman was telling the truth and that 
the jury should believe him because of societal concerns for the 
conduct at issue. 
With respect to the prejudice analysis, the state fails to 
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acknowledge that Carlson's defense hinged on his lack of mental 
culpability, and his defense was presented to the jury in the 
form of his testimony, which in part conflicted with the 
testimony of the used car salesman. By vouching for the testimony 
of the used car salesman, the prosecutor impinged on Carlson's 
right to a fair trial. In addition, since the jurors were asked 
to weigh conflicting evidence and interpretations, it is more 
likely they were improperly influenced through the prosecutor's 
remarks. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in the initial 
Brief, Carlson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and remand the 
case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this X3sU* day of JSLLAUL~~JUX^ 1996. 
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Case No. 950333-CA 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in approving a 
jury instruction premised on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
402(1) (1995), that erroneously stated that the jury could convict 
based on nothing more than possession of recently stolen property? 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in finding the 
hearsay exclusion of defendant's explanation harmless by extending 
the harmless error rule announced in the concurring opinion in 
State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah 1977) (Hall, J., 
concurring) to the situation where previously excluded evidence is 
allowed in, but not over objection? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals in State v. Perez, 
298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996) is attached hereto 
as Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in this case. This Court granted Petitioner an extension 
of time in which to file this Petition for Writ of Certiorari up to 
and including November 5, 1996. Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-4 (1992). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Tony Perez was charged with theft by receiving 
stolen property, a Chevrolet Cavalier, and driving without being 
licensed. R. 79-80.x A two day jury trial was held on the 22nd 
(R. 148-306) and 23rd (R. 307-54) of March, 1995. Mr. Perez was 
convicted of both counts. R. 119-20 (verdicts), 128 (minute 
entry). Mr. Perez was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of 
one to fifteen years and 90 days. R. 130-1. 
On appeal, the State confessed error that the evidence 
did not support the driving while unlicensed conviction, and the 
xMr. Perez was originally charged in the alternative with 
theft by receiving and receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1993), second degree 
felony), but the alternative claim of receiving or transferring was 
dropped at trial. R. 281-6, 309-10. 
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court of appeals correctly vacated that conviction. Perez, 298 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 n.2, 17. The court found that the trial court 
erroneously excluded admissible defense evidence as hearsay, but 
that the error was harmless under State v. Butler. 2 98 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 15-16. Finally, the court of appeals held that instruction 
19, premised on Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) , was proper. 298 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16-17. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Perez was stopped by police in the company of two 
others driving a vehicle that had been stolen earlier that day. R. 
207-15, 218, 199. At trial on the charge of theft by receiving the 
stolen car, the only real issue in controversy was the state of 
mind of Mr. Perez: whether he knew, or believed that the car 
probably had been stolen. 
Over objection, the trial court gave jury instruction 19, 
which read: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession 
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that 
it was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then 
you may infer from these facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
R. 98 (attached as Appendix 2) . 
3 
The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr. 
Perez testifying concerning statements made to him by Jose 
Alcantor, which were directly relevant on the issue of whether Mr. 
Perez knew or had reason to believe that the car was stolen: 
Q Okay. Who was driving? 
A I didn't know at first. He called me over to 
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony." 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to 
what he said. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that 
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his 
actions. 
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So 
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what 
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained, 
objection to hearsay. 
R. 289, 
Q Did he represent that the car was his? 
A Yeah, he did. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay. 
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken. 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the 
car? 
A He did have the keys. 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it was 
stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell 
us what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right, 
THE COURT: All right? 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
292 
Q And why did you flee from the scene? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is 
going to call for a statement by the other individual, 
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in 
fleeing. 
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THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection 
as to what- - are you going to make one? 
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may, yes. 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of 
the jury.) 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when 
you took off, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q All right. Without going into what anybody 
told you, did somebody say something that made you run? 
A Yeah. 
R. 297-8. 
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing 
was the following: 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because he told me the car was stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid? 
A I was afraid. 
Q What were you afraid of? 
A About getting caught with another stolen car. 
Q How about Mr. al Cantor? 
A He didn't look scared about anything. He was 
jumpy, but he wasn't scared. 
Q So the bottom line is you ran because why, you 
were scared? 
A No, because the car was stolen. 
Q When did you find out the car was stolen? 
A When they took us to the side of the road. 
Q And how did you find out the car was stolen? 
A From Mr. al Cantor. 
Q Up to that point did you know that the car was 
stolen? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have 





POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPROVING 
JURY INSTRUCTION 19. 
Jury instruction nineteen, attached as Appendix 2, 
provided: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and 
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by 
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession 
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that 
it was stolen. 
Thus, if you find f rom the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was in 
possession of property, (2) that the property was 
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in 
point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then 
you may infer from these facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property and knew the property was 
stolen. 
R. 98 (attached as Addendum A) . 
This instruction derives from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
402(1) (1995), which provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property. 
A. INSTRUCTION 19 ERRONEOUSLY MIS-STATED 
UTAH LAW. 
No instruction given2 advised the jury that possession of 
instructions 1 through 14 were boilerplate instructions 
concerning juror duties, evidence, burden of proof, and the like. 
R. 81-93. Instructions 15 through 18 were elements and definition 
instructions for theft by receiving. R. 94-97. Instruction 19 is 
the challenged inference instruction. R. 98. Instructions 20 
through 22 were elements instructions for lesser included offenses. 
(continued...) 
6 
recently stolen property alone is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction, though that is clearly the law in Utah: 
The mere possession of stolen property 
unexplained by the person in charge thereof is not in and 
of itself sufficient to justify a conviction of larceny 
of the property." It is, however, a circumstance to be 
considered in connection with the other evidence in the 
case in the determination of the guilt or innocence of 
the possessor. Such possession is a circumstance tending 
in some degree to show guilt, although it is not 
sufficient, standing alone and unsupported by other 
evidence, to warrant a conviction. In addition to the 
proof of the larceny and of the ^possession by the 
defendant, there must be proof of corroborating 
circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt. Such 
corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts, 
conduct, falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if 
any, of the defendant which tend to show his guilt. 
State v. Heath, 492 P.2d 978, 979 (Utah 1972) (footnote cite 
omitted); accord State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983); State v. Thomas, 
244 P.2d 653, 654 (Utaha1952); State v. Nichols, 145 P.2d 802, 
805-6 (Utah 1944); State v. Kinsev, 295 P. 247, 249 (1931). 
Contrary to law, instruction 19 here states that 
possession of recently stolen property, standing alone, IS 
sufficient to sustain a conviction. That the State adduced 
2
 ( . ..continued) 
R. 99-103. Instructions 23 through 25 defined mental states, and 
differentiated intent from motive. R. 104-6. Instruction 26 
stated that both prohibited conduct and a culpable mental state 
must be proven. R. 107. Instruction 27 concerned accomplice 
liability. R. 108. Instruction 28 was an elements instruction for 
driving while unlicensed. R. 109. Instruction 29 defined "on or 
about" (R. 110), instruction 30 concerned flight (R. Ill), 
instruction 31 concerned mistake of fact (R. 112), instruction 32 
advised that punishment lies in the province of the court (R. 113) , 
instruction 33 concerned initial conduct in deliberations (R. 114) , 
and instruction 34 advised that not all instructions may be 
necessary (R. 115) . The instructions conclude with a verdict 
instruction. R. 116-7. 
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additional evidence concerning flight and possible prevarications 
is adequate to survive a sufficiency challenge, but does nothing to 
alter the result that the jury was misinstructed and informed that 
it could convict under circumstances that, standing alone, are 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
This error is prejudicial. In State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 
1201 (Utah 1993), this Court reversed a murder conviction for plain 
error because of an erroneous instruction! 
Under the instruction given, the jury could have 
mistakenly believed that reckless conduct alone is 
sufficient to prove murder in the second degree. 
Second, because the second degree murder statute does not 
include the word "recklessness" in describing the actor's 
mental state and the manslaughter statute does, we think 
the error should have been obvious to the trial judge. 
Third, we find that the error was prejudicial because we 
cannot be sure that the jury did not convict Dunn on the 
basis of a reckless mental state alone. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. Here, we cannot be sure that the jury did 
not convict based on mere possession of recently stolen property. 
As in Dunn, reversal is necessary. Given that here there was a 
contemporaneous objection at trial, reversal is more' appropriate 
here than in Dunn. 
Though briefed by Mr. Perez, Opening Brief at 18-22, the 
court of appeals failed to even acknowledge this argument in its 
opinion. If the court of appeals decision is allowed to stand, 
trial courts will rely on the opinion and instruct juries 
incorrectly in future theft by receiving cases throughout Utah. 
This Court should correct this error at this time. 
The court of appeals decision is in irreconcilable 
conflict with Heath, Smith, Clayton, Thomas, and Kinsev. As a 
8 
result of this conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court 
should grant certiorari review. See Utah R. App. P. 46(a) (2) . The 
court of appeals should be reversed, and Mr. Perez should be 
granted a new trial. 
B. UNDER CHAMBERS. INSTRUCTIONS PREMISED ON 
§ 76-6-402(1) "IN ANY FORM" ARE IMPROPER 
AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN. 
In State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), this 
Court held that an instruction using the verbatim language of § 76-
6-402(1) was unconstitutional because it created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption that relieved the State of its burden of 
persuasion on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 
344 (1985) (rejecting instruction that provided "The acts of a 
person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product 
of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted.") . The 
presence of a further instruction couching the presumption in 
permissive terms failed to cure the problem. 709 P.2d at 326. 
While rejecting the instruction, this Court upheld the 
validity of the statute, noting: 
The statute itself, however is addressed to the court and 
merely provides a standard by which to determine whether 
the evidence presented warrants submission to the jury. 
Thus, the statutory language should not be used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we 
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our 
earlier cases to the contrary. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d at 327 (emphasis added); accord. State v. 
Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) (following Chambers and holding 
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instruction was reversible error), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 
S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986). Under Chambers, instructions 
derived from Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) should not be used to 
instruct juries. The instruction here was error under the 
supervisory authority exercised in Chambers. 
State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986), is not to the 
contrary. While finding the challenged instruction erroneous, the 
court emphasized that use of "if" and "may"* rendered application of 
the inference permissive: 
Thus, the court explained that the statutory language 
incorporated in the instruction allowed only an inference 
of guilt, and then only if justified by the facts. 
Indeed, the court made the same point even more 
extensively in a later instruction.1 
We do not believe that the jury, in the face of 
these instructions, could have reasonably applied the 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner. 
Furthermore, the trial court explained to the 
jury that possession alone of a stolen object is not 
sufficient to support a conviction, a rule that has been 
reiterated in numerous opinions. [cites and quotes 
omitted] 
The Court also instructed: 
The mere fact that a person was in conscious 
possession of recently stolen property is not 
sufficient to justify a conviction of theft. There 
must be proof of other circumstances tending of 
themselves to establish guilt. However, such proof 
need not be established by additional evidence or 
witnesses if you find that the possession occurred 
under circumstances which warrants [sic] a finding 
of guilty. In this, connection you may consider 
the defendant's conduct, any false or contradictory 
statements, and any other statements the defendant 
may have made with reference to the property. If 
the defendant gives a false account of how he 
acquired possession of stolen property this is a 
circumstance that may tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to why the 
defendant was in possession of recently stolen 
10 
property, you may infer that the defendant stole 
the property. 
Smith, 726 P. 2d at 1234-5 & n.l. This Court "emphatically 
declare [d] that we do not retreat from Chambers," 726 P. 2d at 1235, 
and held "only that the instruction cannot be deemed reversible 
error in this case in light of the clear explanatory instructions 
that all that the jury could make of the term 'prima facie' was a 
permissible inference." 726 P.2d at 1236. 
While the instruction here created only a permissive 
inference, the additional instructions found critical in Smith were 
absent here. The jury was not instructed that mere possession 
alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction. To the contrary, 
instruction 19 affirmatively instructed that mere possession alone 
is sufficient, despite the fact that this is erroneous under the 
law. Individually, and in conjunction with the erroneous hearsay 
exclusion of Mr. Perez' proffered testimony concerning his good 
faith belief that the car was not stolen, this error prejudiced Mr. 
Perez. 
Contrary to Chambers, the court of appeals held that the 
instruction here was not error. The court of appeals decision is 
in irreconcilable conflict with Chambers. As a result of this 
conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court should grant 
certiorari review. See Utah R. App. P. 46(a)(2). The court of 
appeals should be reversed, and Mr. Perez should be granted a new 
trial. 
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POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING 
THE HEARSAY EXCLUSION OF DEFENDANTS 
EXPLANATION HARMLESS BY EXTENDING THE HARMLESS 
ERROR RULE ANNOUNCED IN THE CONCURRING OPINION 
IN STATE V. BUTLER, 560 P. 2D 1136, 1140 (UTAH 
1977) (HALL, J., CONCURRING) TO THE SITUATION 
WHERE PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED 
IN, BUT NOT OVER OBJECTION. 
The trial court repeatedly sustained objections to Mr. 
Perez testifying concerning statements made to him by Jose 
Alcantor, which were directly relevant on the issue of whether Mr. 
Perez knew or had reason to believe that the car was stolen: 
Q Okay. Who was driving? 
A I didn't know at first. He called me over to 
the car, he said, "Tony, Tony." 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained as to 
what he said. 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Okay. We're not offering that 
for the truth of the matter asserted; just to explain his 
actions. 
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. So 
I haven't heard what he has said, nor do I know what 
you're offering it for. But the objection is sustained, 
objection to hearsay. 
R. 289. 
Q Did he represent that the car was his? 
A Yeah, he did. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay. 
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken. 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have the keys to the 
car? 
A He did have the keys. 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it was 
stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell 
us what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: All right? 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
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292. 
Q And why did you flee from the scene? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe this is 
going to call for a statement by the other individual, 
however we're not offering that to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, simply to explain his actions in 
fleeing. 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an objection 
as to what- - are you going to make one? 
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may, yes. 
(Side bar conference held out of the hearing of 
the jury.) 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a time when 
you took off, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q All right. Without going into what anybody 
told you, did somebody say something that made you run? 
A Yeah. 
297-8. 
The only evidence Mr. Perez was successful in adducing 
the following: 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because he told me the car was stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
Q (BY MR. YOUNGBERG) Were you afraid? 
A I was afraid. 
Q What were you afraid of? 
A About getting caught with another stolen car. 
Q How about Mr. al Cantor? 
A He didn't look scared about anything. He was 
jumpy, but he wasn't scared. 
Q So the bottom line is you ran because why, you 
were scared? 
A No, because the car was stolen. 
Q When did you find out the car was stolen? 
A When they took us to the side of the road. 
Q And how did you find out the car was stolen? 
A From Mr. al Cantor. 
Q Up to that point did you know that the car was 
stolen? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any- - In Your mind did you have 




The court of appeals properly found that the trial 
court's repeated exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence on 
hearsay grounds was error. 298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. However, the 
court of appeals erroneously concluded that these errors were 
harmless, relying on State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Hall, 
J., concurring). 
In Butler, it was asserted that the trial court had 
erroneously sustained hearsay objections to statements made by a 
homicide victim offered by defendant to show that the defendant was 
operating under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. 
In fact, the court allowed defendant to 
testify, over objection, about the conversation with his 
wife wherein she related that the victim had threatened 
defendant with bodily harm. In light of this ruling 
allowing hearsay, the prior ruling prohibiting it, if 
error at all, was harmless error. 
Butler, 560 P.2d at 1140 (Hall, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the trial court had repeatedly 
sustained unfounded hearsay objections to Mr. Perez testifying 
concerning statements made to him by Jose Alcantor to the effect 
that Mr. Alcantor had purchased the car. The evidence Mr. Perez 
was able to get in was immediately preceded by the trial court 
sustaining an objection to Mr. Perez testifying that Mr. Alcantor 
told him for the first time at the scene of the traffic stop that 
the car was stolen. 
The State did not object to the testimony that finally 
came in. Coming hot on the heels of the prior erroneous rulings, 
14 
R. 289, 291, 292, 297-8, 299, there can be no confidence that the 
jury accepted this evidence at face value. Had the State objected, 
and the objection been overruled, the evidence would stand on a 
different footing, and Butler would be applicable. The jury would 
have a clear directive from the court that it should consider the 
evidence, and the prior errors would thus arguably be harmless. 
In this case, every directive from the court was that the 
jury could not consider the evidence proffered by Mr. Perez. It is 
entirely possible, and in fact probable, that the jury disregarded 
this testimony because the trial court had repeatedly sustained 
objections to this testimony. The trial court had even admonished 
Mr. Perez that he was not allowed to tell the jury anything that 
anyone else had said: 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it was 
stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't tell 
us what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: All right? 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
R. 292. Given this incorrect guidance from the court, the jury 
probably felt constrained to disregard the explanation proffered by 
Mr. Perez. Individually, and in conjunction with the erroneous 
jury instruction, Mr. Perez was prejudiced. 
This Court should grant certiorari review to correct the 
error of the court of appeals, and the unwarranted extension of 
Butler to a situation where it is inapposite. Utah R. App. P. 
46(a) (2) . 
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CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, petitioner respectfully 
requests that this Court grant certiorari review. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S day of November, 1996. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
ROBIN K. YOUNGBERG 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 1 
Opinion in State v. Perez, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 
App. 1996) 
14 State v. Perez 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 Code«Co Provo, Utah 
agree that under such an interpretation, uan 
attorney's fee 'presupposes a relationship of 
attorney and client1 which does not exist in pro 
se situations." Id. (citing Davis v. Parratt, 608 
F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979)). It is our view 
that a law firm does not "incur" fees when it 
uses its own attorneys in a collection action. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court was 
correct in ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to 
attorney fees in its pro se collection action 
against Dawson. 
CONCLUSION 
We direct that the judgment of the trial court 
be amended to award plaintiff a total of $18,000 
less amounts paid by Dawson, together with 
interest on the unpaid balance thereof for 
plaintiffs representation of Dawson in the trial 
court in the divorce action. Fees which have 
been awarded for plaintiffs work on appeal of 
the divorce case are not disturbed by this ruling 
since no specific challenge to these fees appears 
in the briefs. The trial court's denial of fees to 
plaintiff for its pro se representation in this 
action is affirmed. 
As a postscript to our decision, we observe 
that the events that brought this case to this 
court are disturbing. Dawson was awarded 
rehabilitative alimony of $1,400 per month for 
a two-year period, but because plaintiff was 
successful in tying up those funds, she was 
denied the timely benefit of that award. Plaintiff 
withdrew from representing Dawson while the 
appeal of the divorce case was pending and 
retained Dawson's file, claiming an attorney's 
lien on it. She was obliged to engage new 
counsel who successfully defended the appeal 
without the file. The Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct allow an attorney to withdraw from 
representation for nonpayment of fees if the 
client has been given adequate warning. Utah R. 
Professional Conduct 1.14(b)(4) (1995). The 
rules require, however, that upon termination of 
representation, "a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interests, such as surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled." Utah R. 
Professional Conduct 1.14(d) (1995). Plaintiff 
failed to protect Dawson's best interest when it 
refused to surrender her file in derogation of 
that rule. 
We urge members of the Bar to be clear and 
fair in their fee negotiations with clients and to 
avoid the misunderstandings that brought this 
case about. Fees should not be driven by billable 
hour requirements imposed by lawyers on 
themselves and by their firms. Moreover, when 
disputes do arise, attorneys should settle them 
without resorting to tying up rehabilitative 
alimony and retaining files to coerce payment. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman, Justice Durham, 
and Justice Russon concur in Justice Howe's 
opinion. 
Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief 
Justice Stewart does not participate herein. 
1. It is interesting to note that Mr. Shelton's fees to 
his counsel for the divorce action were $19,640, 
which corresponds closely to Shaw's original high-end 
projection. 
2. The Utah rule is usubstantially the same as rule 8, 
F.R.C.P." Utah R. Civ. P. 8, at 22 (Compiler's 
Notes). 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Tony Perez appeals his convictions 
for driving while unlicensed, a Class C 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§53-3-202 (Supp. 1995), and theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1995). 
We affirm defendant's conviction of theft by 
receiving but vacate defendant's conviction for 
driving without a license. 
FACTS 
On February 4, 1995, Bernie Gonzales 
reported to police that his car was stolen from 
his driveway. That afternoon, Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper Kathy Slagowski pulled over his 
car because she saw the passenger smoking what 
she thought was a marijuana cigarette. Despite 
her request, none of the occupants of the car 
produced identification. Trooper Slagowski 
testified that "the driver [the defendant] told me 
he didn't have his driver's license with him, or 
didn't have one, I don't recall." Tmnts+r 
Code«Co 
Provo, Utah 
State v. ] 
298 Utah Adv. 
Slagowski then asked the three individuals to 
stand by the guard rail while she radioed for 
backup. 
While Trooper Slagowski was calling for 
backup, defendant and his passengers ran across 
the six-lane freeway. The trooper informed the 
dispatch office of the escape and two officers 
responded. The police eventually found 
defendant and his passengers hiding in a 
warehouse. 
After defendant's apprehension, he gave 
conflicting stories to the police. Defendant told 
Trooper Dan Ferguson that he did not know the 
car was stolen because one of the passengers, 
Jose Al Cantor, had picked him up and that he 
ran because he thought Al Cantor had drugs or 
guns. Initially, defendant also told Trooper Mike 
Cowdell that Al Cantor had picked him up in the 
car, but later claimed they had asked to borrow 
the car from the owner. 
Defendant was charged with theft by receiving 
stolen property, and driving without being 
licensed. During the trial, the court repeatedly 
sustained the State's hearsay objections to 
defendant's testimony of statements made to him 
by Jose Al Cantor regarding whether he knew 
the car was stolen. The trial court also gave a 
juiy instruction on receipt of stolen property 
over defendant's objection. Defendant was 
convicted of driving without being licensed and 
theft by receiving stolen property. 
Defendant now appeals, claiming the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction for 
driving without being licensed,2 the trial court 
erred in sustaining the hearsay objections, the 
trial court improperly instructed the jury on 
receipt of stolen property, and that cumulative 
error mandates reversal.3 
I. HEARSAY 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in 
sustaining the State's repeated hearsay objections 
to defendant's testimony of statements made to 
him by Jose Al Cantor as they were not offered 
for the truth of the matters stated but only to 
establish defendant's actions in response to these 
statements. 
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant. . . , offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah 
R. Evid. 801(c) (emphasis added). "However, if 
an out-of-court statement is 'offered simply to 
prove that it was made, without regard to 
whether it is true, such testimony is not 
proscribed by the hearsay rule/" State v. Olsen, 
860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. 
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980)). 
Whether a statement is offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted is a question of law, which 
we review under a correction of error standard. 
Id. 
The following colloquies occurred between 
defendant and his defense counsel at trial: 
Q Did he represent that the car was his? 
A Yeah, he did. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MS. BYRNE: Hearsay. 
THE COURT: It's sustained and stricken. 
Q (By MR. YOUNGBERG) Did he have 
the keys to the car? 
A He did have the keys. 
Q Did he give you any reason to think it 
was stolen? 
A None at all. He told me he bought the 
car. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Perez, don't 
tell us what anybody else said. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: All right? 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
Q And why did you flee from the scene? 
MR. YOUNGBERG: Your Honor, I believe 
this is going to call for a statement by the 
other individual, however we're not offering 
that to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, simply to explain his actions in 
fleeing. 
THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard an 
objection as to what—are you going to make 
one? 
MS. BYRNE: May we approach the bench, 
Your Honor? 
Q (MR. YOUNGBERG) So there came a 
time when you took off, right? 
A Yeah. 
Q All right. Without going into what 
anybody told you, did somebody say 
something that made you run? 
A Yeah. 
Q So why did you run, Tony? 
A Because somebody told me the car was 
stolen. 
MS. BYRNE: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
We agree that defendant was not trying to 
prove whether Mr. Al Cantor stole the car. 
Rather, defendant was merely offering an 
explanation for his actions. Thus, the truth or 
falsity of Mr. Al Cantor's statements is 
immaterial. Therefore, we conclude these 
statements were not hearsay and were 
improperly excluded at trial. 
However, "[w]e may not interfere with a jury 
verdict unless upon review of the entire record, 
there emerges error of sufficient gravity to 
indicate that a defendant's rights were prejudiced 
in a substantial manner." State v. Salmon, 612 
P.2d 366, 370 (Utah 1980). We must find, 
absent the error, "a reasonable probability there 
would have been a result more favorable to 
defendant." Id. 
Defendant admits the excluded evidence 
eventually came in through subsequent 
questioning. Nonetheless, defendant claims his 
subsequent testimony was not enough to cure the^  
court's error. We disagree. 
1£ 
Defendant had the following exchange with his 
defense counsel at trial: 
Q So the bottom line is you ran because 
why, you were scared? 
A No, because the car was stolen. 
Q When did you find out the car was 
stolen? 
A When they took us to the side of the 
road. 
Q And how did you find out the car was 
stolen? 
A From Mr. Al Cantor. 
Q Up to that point did you know that the car 
was stolen? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any—In your mind did you 
have any reason to think that [the] car was 
stolen? 
A No. 
In this exchange, defendant was able to testify 
that he did not know the car was stolen until 
they were being detained, that he had no reason 
to believe the car was stolen until that point in 
time, and that he ran because he had just been 
told the car was stolen. These statements formed 
the basis of defendant's defense and were the 
substance of the erroneously excluded testimony. 
Once the court allowed the testimony to come 
in, any prior ruling prohibiting it was harmless 
error. See State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140 
(Utah 1977) (Hall, J., concurring). Therefore, 
we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by the 
court's evidentiary rulings. 
H. JURY INSTRUCTION 
Next, defendant claims the trial court 
improperly instructed the jury as to receipt of 
stolen property because the language of the 
instruction improperly shifted the burden of 
proof to defendant. 
The instruction at issue derives, in part, from 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402(1) (1995), which 
provides: 
Possession of property recently stolen, when 
no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence that the person in possession 
stole the property. 
There is considerable Utah case law 
addressing jury instructions dealing with this 
statutory presumption. State v. Chambers, 709 
P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), is an appropriate place to 
begin our analysis. The instruction in Chambers 
quoted section 76-6-402(1) verbatim. The court 
held that using the language of section 
76-6-402(1) created an unconstitutional 
mandatory rebuttable presumption, which 
"'requires the jury to find the element unless the 
defendant persuades the jury that such a finding 
is unwarranted,'" and thus improperly relieves 
the State of its burden of proof. Id. at 326 
(quoting Francis v. Franklin, All U.S. 307, 314 
n.2, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971 n.2 (1985)). The 
court noted that the question of a prima facie 
case is a question of law for the court to 
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sufficient to submit to the jury. Id. at 327. Thus, 
to give such a charge "'would only be 
confiising'" to the jury. Id. (citation omitted). 
The Chambers court concluded "the statutory 
language should not be used in any form." Id. 
Nevertheless, the Chambers court emphasized 
that section 76-6-402(1), upon which the 
instruction was based, had no constitutional 
infirmity when properly construed. Id. at 326. 
The court cited with approval State v. Asay, 631 
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981), where the following 
instruction based on section 76-6-402(1) was 
approved: "You are further instructed that one 
who is found to be in possession of property 
recently stolen may be found to be the guilty 
person unless he gives a satisfactory explanation 
of his possession thereof." Id. at 863 (emphasis 
added). 
In a subsequent case, State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
1232 (Utah 1986), the supreme court clarified its 
holding in Chambers and upheld a jury 
instruction even though it included the statutory 
language. Id. at 1235-36. The instruction stated: 
Utah law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant was in possession of stolen 
property, that such possession was not too 
remote in point of time from the theft, and 
the defendant made no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession, then you 
may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
Id. at 1234 (emphasis added). 
The court recognized Chambers's holding 
"that a jury instruction using the language of 
section 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional because 
it Velievefd] the State of its burden of proof.'" 
Id. (citation omitted). The court then explained 
j that "[a]n instruction that simply incorporates the 
statutory language is unconstitutional when the 
statutory term 'prima facie' is defined as a 
presumption, as was the case in Chambers.n Id. 
I The Smith court emphasized that the instruction 
before it, although containing the statutory 
j language, "carefully stated that the statutory 
j language meant only that if the jury found 
certain facts that 'you may infer from those facts 
that the defendant committed the theft. *" Id. The 
court stated "the statutory language incorporated 
I in the instruction allowed only an inference of 
guilt, and then only if justified by the facts." Id. 
Therefore, although the court held "the trial 
court should not have used the statutory 
language in the instruction for the reasons stated 
in Chambers,11 the instruction could not be 
"deemed reversible error . . . in light of the 
clear explanatory instructions that all that the 
jury could make of the term 'prima facie' was a 
permissible inference." Id. at 1235-36. Thus-
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even though the first paragraph of the instruction 
quoted the statute verbatim, the court upheld it 
because the context of the instruction as a whole 
allowed only a permissible inference. 
We examine the instruction at issue in light of 
this authority. The instruction provides:: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if 
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may 
reasonably draw the inference and find, in 
light of the surrounding circumstances 
shown by the evidence in the case, that the 
person in possession of the stolen property 
stole the property and knew that it was 
stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the 
defendant was in possession of property, (2) 
that the property was stolen, (3) thai: such 
possession was not too remote in point of 
time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation appears from the 
evidence, then you may infer from these 
facts and find that the defendant stole the 
property and knew the property was stolen. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the second paragraph of this instruction, the 
trial court instructed the jury with nearly the 
same permissible inference as in Smith. The 
instruction stated only if you find these facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt, may you infer from 
those facts the defendant stole the property or 
knew the property was stolen. Further, whereas 
the first paragraph of the Smith instruction 
quoted the statute verbatim, the first paragraph 
of the instruction in this case merely paraphrases 
the statutory language, eliminating the confusing 
term prima facie and, in fact, emphasizes the 
discretion allowed the fact finder. The 
challenged instruction did not improperly shift 
the burden of proof to defendant, and we 
therefore conclude the instruction was not error. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude there was not sufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction for driving while 
unlicensed, and we vacate that conviction. We 
also conclude the trial court erroneously 
sustained hearsay objections; however, those 
errors were harmless. Finally, we conclude the 
challenged jury instruction did not shift the 
burden of proof to defendant and therefore the 
instruction was proper. Accordingly, we uphold 
defendant's conviction for theft by receiving 
stolen property. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Senior Judge 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-4(2) 
(1995); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 3-108(4). 
2. Defendant argues and the State concedes that the 
evidence of defendant's driving without being licensed 
is insufficient to support a guilty verdict. We 
commend the State for its candor and reverse 
defendant's conviction for driving without being 
licensed. 
3. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will 
reverse only if 'the cumulative effect of the several 
[otherwise harmless] errors undermines our confidence 
. . . that a fair trial was had.*" State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (quoting Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 
(Utah 1990)). After a full review of the record and 
our reversal of one of defendant's convictions, the 
cumulative effect of the identified errors does not 
undermine our confidence in the essential fairness of 
defendant's trial on receiving stolen property. 
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ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Claiming the prosecution breached the terms 
of his plea agreement, defendant appeals his 
convictions for forcible sexual abuse and 
unlawful sexual intercourse. We conclude the 
issue was not preserved for appeal and that 
"exceptional circumstances" do not exist so as to 
permit our consideration of the issue absent 
preservation. Accordingly, we affirm. 
FACTS 
Defendant was charged with rape, a 
first-degree felony. At his original arraignment, 
he pled not guilty. During the course of 
investigation, new charges surfaced against 
defendant and defendant entered into plea 
negotiations with the State. Defendant agreed to 
plead guilty to a second-degree felony, forcible 
sexual assault, and a third-decree felnnv 
APPENDIX 2 
Instruction 19 (R. 98) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Possession of property recently stolen, if not 
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which 
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that 
the person in possession of the stolen property stole the 
property and knew that the property was stolen. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt il% that the defendant was in possession of property, fan 
that the property was stolen, ((3)) that ..such possession was not 
too remote in point of time from the theft, and (4) that no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or 
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts 
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the 
property was stolen. 
